




Abstract: The aim of this paper is to provide a minimalist axiomatic the-
ory of truth based on the notion of reference. To do this, we first give
sound and arithmetically simple notions of reference, self-reference, and
well-foundedness for the language of first-order arithmetic extended with a
truth predicate; a task that has been so far elusive in the literature. Then,
we use the new notions to restrict the T-schema to sentences that exhibit
‘safe’ reference patterns, confirming the widely accepted but never worked
out idea that paradoxes can be characterised in terms of their underlying ref-
erence patterns. This results in a strong, ω-consistent, and well-motivated
system of disquotational truth, as required by minimalism.
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The core of minimalism, one of the most popular versions of deflationism6
about truth nowadays, consist of the following two theses: first, that the7
meaning of the truth predicate is exhausted by the T-schema, this is8
Tpϕq↔ ϕ, (T-schema)
where T stands for the truth predicate, ϕ is a sentence and pϕq a quotational9
name for it.2 Second, that the truth predicate is just a logico-linguistic device10
that exists in the language solely to allow us to express certain things—main-11
ly generalisations—we simply cannot express otherwise. The latter prompts12
the construction of ‘logics’ or axiomatic theories of truth. The former thesis13
1I’m obliged to Eduardo Barrio, Volker Halbach, Hannes Leitgeb, Thomas Schindler, the
Buenos Aires Logic Group, and the MCMP logic group for their extremely useful comments,
suggestions, and corrections on previous stages of this work.
2Actually, Horwich (1998), the main exponent of minimalism, takes propositions to be truth
bearers rather than sentences. In his account pϕq should be understood as a canonical name of
the proposition expressed by ϕ.
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suggests the instances of the T-schema—i.e. the T-biconditionals—as ax-14
ioms.15
Unfortunately, as is well-known, if the language is capable of self-refer-16
ence and the underlying logic is classical, the full T-schema leads to para-17
dox. For we can formulate a liar sentence λ, that “says of itself” that it’s18
untrue. Thus, we have that19
λ↔ ¬Tpλq, (1)
which obviously contradicts the T-biconditional for λ. As a consequence,20
minimalists choose to let some T-biconditionals go, as follows:21
[. . . ] the principles governing our selection of excluded in-22
stances are, in order of priority: (a) that the minimal theory23
not engender ‘liar-type’ contradictions; (b) that the set of ex-24
cluded instances be as small as possible; and—perhaps just as25
important as (b)—(c) that there be a constructive specification26
of the excluded instances that is as simple as possible. (Hor-27
wich, 1998, p. 42)28
Theories consisting exclusively of instances of the T-schema are called29
disquotational. The search for a constructive and encompassing policy for30
selecting jointly-consistent instances of this principle is what we call the31
minimalist project.32
The task is not as easy as it may seem. The most natural option, namely33
letting the instances that lead to contradiction go, is not available, as McGee34
(1992) has shown. There is not one but many different maximal consistent35
sets of T-biconditionals, all of which are highly complex—not even arith-36
metically definable. A stricter criterion than mere consistency is needed.37
Horwich himself puts forward a plausible restriction:38
The intuitive idea is that an instance of the equivalence [T-]39
schema will be acceptable, even if it governs a proposition con-40
cerning truth (e.g. “What John said is true”), as long as that41
proposition (or its negation) is grounded—i.e. is entailed either42
by the non-truth-theoretic facts, or by those facts together with43
whichever truth-theoretic facts are ‘immediately’ entailed by44
them (via the already legitimised instances of the equivalence45
schema), or . . . and so on. (Horwich, 2005, p. 81)46
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However, he doesn’t specify in which way we should understand ‘grounded’47
or ‘entailed’. Moreover, the notions of grounding (Kripke, 1975) and depen-48
dence on non-truth-theoretic facts (Leitgeb, 2005) that are available in the49
literature, even though they can lead to a unique set of acceptable instances50
of the T-schema, are far from supporting a constructive specification.51
Perhaps the criterion that fares best so far is that of T -positiveness: only52
sentences in which the truth predicate occurs positively (i.e. under the scope53
of an even number of negation symbols) are allowed in the T-schema (Hal-54
bach, 2009). This is a recursive restriction that results in an ω-consistent55
powerful system when formulated over Peano arithmetic, called PUTB.356
However, T -positiveness is a highly artificial restriction. It leaves out many57
intuitively harmless instances of the T-schema, and is inconsistent with ap-58
pealing truth principles, like consistency and the fact that Modus Ponens59
and Conditional Proof preserve truth.60
According to the orthodox view on paradoxes driven by Poincaré, Rus-61
sell and Tarski, among others, semantic paradoxes and other pathological62
expressions are characterised by a common reference pattern, namely, self-63
reference. That certainly seems to be the case for liar sentences. This view64
has never been thoroughly investigated, mainly because of the elusiveness65
of a sound notion of reference for formal languages. If true, self-reference66
could be employed as a plausible restriction on the T-schema. Moreover,67
since reference has a syntactic vein, the resulting criterion could be in prin-68
ciple simple enough to give axiomatic disquotational theories.69
However, Yablo (1985, 1993) challenged the orthodox view with a prima70
facie non-self-referential semantic paradox. This antinomy gave rise to a71
lively debate on its referential status that put in evidence the lack of sound72
and precise notions of reference and self-reference in the literature to assess73
paradoxes in formal languages (cf. Cook, 2006; Leitgeb, 2002). Until we74
come up with such notions, neither the orthodox view nor the referential75
status of Yablo’s paradox can be evaluated properly.76
The first goal of this paper is to remedy this situation. After some77
technical preliminaries in section 2, section 3 provides precise and intu-78
itively appealing definitions of reference, and thus self-reference and well-79
foundedness, for formal languages of truth. As it turns out, according to80
3PUTB can relatively interpret the Ramified Theory of Truth up to the ordinal ε0, RT<ε0 , an
axiomatic version of Tarski’s hierarchy of semantic theories, and the Kripke-Fererman theory
KF, an axiomatisation of Kripke’s fixed-point semantic theory with the strong Kleene valuation
scheme. In fact, it can be show that all three systems have the same proof-theoretic power. For
an introduction to the systems and proofs of the quoted results see (Halbach, 2011), instead.
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our definitions, the orthodox view is wrong, for Yablo’s paradox isn’t self-81
referential. Nonetheless, we show it is still possible to characterise the se-82
mantic paradoxes in terms of their referential patterns: they are all non-well-83
founded, as Horwich notices. This will become evident in section 4. Since84
the new notions are of a proof-theoretic nature, we employ them in the con-85
struction of an axiomatic theory given by well-founded T-bicondicionals.86
We show that this system is sound and at least as strong as the best regarded87
axiomatic theories in the literature. Thus, in section 5 we conclude it’s a88
good candidate for minimalism, the second and main aim of this note.89
2 Technical preliminaries90
Let L be the language of first-order Peano arithmetic (PA), with ¬, →,∀91
and = as primitive logical symbols. Formulae containing ∧, ∨, ↔ and92
∃ are understood as abbreviations. L contains one individual constant 0,93
the successor function symbol S, and finitely many other function symbols94
for primitive recursive (p.r.) functions, to be specified. L has no predicate95
symbols besides identity. Other relation symbols such as < are mere abbre-96
viations. For each n ∈ ω, the complex term given by n occurrences of S97
followed by 0 is the numeral of n, which we note n̄. N is the standard model98
of L, with ω as its domain.99
LT , our language of truth, expands L with a new predicate symbol T100
for truth. PAT is the result of formulating PA in LT , taking all the instances101
of induction given by formulae of this language as axioms. If Γ ⊆ ω, let102
〈N,Γ〉 be the expansion of N to LT , assigning Γ to T as its extension.103
The expressions of LT can be codified with natural numbers à la Gödel,104
so that L and its extensions can be understood as talking about these ex-105
pressions and sequences (instead of numbers). Given a particular coding106
and an expression σ of LT , #(σ) is the code of σ and pσq is the numeral of107
this code. We assume a standard coding, this is effective and monotonic.4108
Usually, we identify expressions with their codes, for perspicuity.109
As is well known, for any n ∈ ω the (semi-)recursive subsets of ωn can110
be defined in L and (weakly) represented in PA.5 Let ClTerm(v) represent111
the recursive set of closed terms of LT . If TH ⊆ LT is a recursively axioma-112
tisable system, BewTH(v) weakly represents the set of its theorems. If TH is113
4I.e. if a string of symbols σ occurs in another string σ′, then #(σ) < #(σ′).
5Actually, this is possible already in Robinson arithmetic, a subsystem of PA. We use the
latter for uniformity.
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PA, we omit the subscript. We assume that all predicates BewTH(v) satisfy114
Löb’s derivability conditions (cf. Löb, 1955).115
For any expression σ, let ~σ abbreviate σ1, . . . , σn. The diagonalisation116
function, that takes a formula ϕ(v,~v) and returns ∀v(v = pϕq → ϕ), is117
represented in PA by Diag(u, v). The evaluation function, that takes a term118
t of LT and returns the numeral of the number it denotes, is also recursive119
and representable in PA by val(u, v).120
We assume L contains the following function symbols for p.r. functions,121
and PA their corresponding definitions: ¬. v for the function that maps ϕ into122
¬ϕ, u(v/w) for the substitution function, that takes a formula ϕ and two123
terms t and s and replaces s in ϕ with t, and v̇ for the numeral function that124
assigns to each number n its numeral n̄. L cannot contain a function symbol125
for the evaluation function for its own terms, on pain of triviality. However,126
we write u◦ = v for the evaluation function as short for val(u, v).127
Let ∀v(ψ(pϕ(v̇)q)) abbreviate ∀v(ψ(pϕq(v̇/puq))), which allows us to128
quantify over the free occurrences of v in ϕ[v/u] when ϕ is between corner129
quotes. Also, let ∀tϕ abbreviate ∀v(ClTerm(v) → ϕ). As before, instead130
of ∀t(ψ(pϕq(t/pvq))) we write ∀t(ψ(pϕ(t.)q)) to quantify over terms within131
Gödel quotes.132
Later it will become useful to have in mind the proof of the following133
well-known result.134
Theorem 1 (Weak diagonal lemma) For any formula ϕ(v,~v) ∈ LT there135
is a formula ψ(~v) ∈ L s.t.136
PAT ` ψ(~v)↔ ϕ(pψ(~v)q, ~v)
Proof. The result of applying the diagonalisation function to137
∀u(Diag(v, u)→ ϕ(u,~v))
is the formula138
∀v(v = p∀u(Diag(v, u)→ ϕ(u,~v))q→ ∀u(Diag(v, u)→ ϕ(u,~v))) (2)
Let a be the numeral of the Gödel code of (2). (2) is equivalent in PAT to139
∀u(Diag(p∀u(Diag(v, u)→ ϕ(u,~v))q, u)→ ϕ(u,~v))
which is equivalent to ϕ(a,~v).140
It’s possible to strengthen this result using function symbols as follows:141
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Theorem 2 (Strong diagonal lemma) For any formula ϕ(v,~v) of LT there142
is a term t s.t.143
PA ` t = pϕ(t, ~v)q
It is commonly thought that both diagonal lemmata deliver self-referen-144
tial expressions. For instance, applying strong diagonalisation to the predi-145
cate ¬Bew(v) we obtain a term g s.t.146
PA ` g = p¬Bew(g)q (3)
¬Bew(g) is a Gödel sentence of PA and it is usually understood as “saying147
of itself” that it isn’t provable in PA. As is well known, this sentence is true148
and therefore unprovable in PA.149
Finally, recall that formulae in L can be classified according to their150
quantificational—also called arithmetical—complexity into sets Σn,Πn and151
∆n ⊆ L, with n ∈ ω. These sets constitute the arithmetical hierarchy. If152
ϕ is logically equivalent to a formula where all quantifiers are bound, ϕ is153
both Σ0 and Π0. If ϕ is logically equivalent to a formula of the form ∀~vψ,154
where ψ ∈ Σn, then ϕ ∈ Πn+1. If ϕ is logically equivalent to a formula of155
the form ¬∀~vψ where ψ ∈ Πn, then ϕ ∈ Σn+1. Finally, if ϕ is both Πn and156
Σn, we say that ϕ ∈ ∆n. Note that the sets in the hierarchy are cumulative,157
for it’s always possible to add superfluous quantifiers at the beginning of a158
formula.159
Recursive sets can be defined in L by ∆0-formulae, and semi-recursive160
sets by Σ1-formulae. Non-semi-recursive sets can only be defined by more161
complex formulae, if at all. Every ∆0-formula is decidable in PA. If ϕ ∈ Σ1162
is true in the standard model, then PA ` ϕ, this is, PA is Σ1-complete. For163
other, more complex expressions, we have no guarantees.164
3 Alethic reference165
In this section we focus on the reference of sentences of LT to sentences166
of the same language. This isn’t just any kind of reference but reference167
through the truth predicate or, as we call it, alethic reference. Intuitively,168
an expression alethically refers to all sentences that syntactically fall, as it169
were, under the scope of the truth predicate. This will become clear soon.170
The notion we provide, is, as we show, of a low arithmetical complexity,171
though this doesn’t come without costs.172
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A sentence in a first-order language can refer to an object either by men-173
tioning it or by quantifying over it. In the first case, the expression must con-174
tain a term t that denotes the object. Since we’re only interested in alethic175
reference, we have the following definition.176
Definition 1 Let ϕ and ψ be sentences of LT . ϕ refers by mention to ψ,177
or m-refers, for short, iff ϕ contains a subsentence Tt and PA ` t = pψq.178
Note that if t actually denotes the code of ψ then PA will be able to prove179
it, for identity statements don’t contain quantifiers. Definition 1 covers many180
cases, like the liar sentence that obtains applying the strong diagonal lemma181
to ¬Tv, that is182
PA ` l = p¬T lq, (4)
that intuitively m-refers to itself. In general, any sentence that result from183
strongly diagonalising formulae that contain Tv as a subformula will m-184
refer to themselves. On the other hand, if we strongly diagonalise formulae185
that don’t satisfy this condition, we might not get self-referential expres-186
sions. For instance, diagonalising T¬. v we get187
PA ` l′ = pT¬. l′q. (5)
T¬. l′ is an alternative liar sentence that doesn’t refer to itself according188
to definition 1 but only to its negation. The latter is actually the self-m-189
referential one. This follows from (5) and the fact that ¬T¬. l′ contains T¬. l′190
as a subsentence.191
Sentences of LT can also refer to other sentences by quantifying over192
them. For instance,193
∀x(Bew(x)→ Tx) (6)
intuitively refers to all theorems of arithmetic, while194
∀xTx (7)
seems to refer to everything. Conditionals allow us to restrict reference195
by quantification. Thus, if a universal quantifier or a string of universal196
quantifiers is followed by a conditional expression, we would like to say197
that it refers to whatever satisfies the antecedent, and otherwise it refers to198
everything.199
However, things are not so simple. In the first place, talking about satis-200
faction introduces too much complexity into our notion, for to know whether201
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an arbitrary code satisfies a certain formula we would have to look into202
the set of arithmetically true statements, which is not arithmetically defin-203
able. Thus, we turn to the notion of provability instead. After all, what204
matters to avoid paradoxes is that we cannot derive a contradiction or an205
unsound claim. Consequently, the resulting notion of reference via quan-206
tification—or q-reference, for short—will be tied to a particular system, the207
system whose provability predicate we employ in the definition. We work208
in PA, but any extension of Robinson arithmetic works as well.209
Secondly, recall we’re only interested in alethic reference here, so what210
matters is what actually falls under the scope of T . While in (6) all theorems211
of arithmetic fall under the scope of T , in ∀x(Bew(x) → T¬. x) only their212
negations do. Analogously, in (7) all sentences fall under T but in ∀xT¬. x213
only negations do. And the same can be said of more complex expressions.214
For instance, in ∀x(Bew(x) → ∀y(y = ¬. x → ¬Ty)), again, only nega-215
tions of PA’s theorems fall under the scope of the truth predicate. Thus, we216
define q-reference recursively. Roughly, a universal expression q-refers to217
whatever its instances m- or q-refer to, unless the universal quantifier is fol-218
lowed by a conditional, in which case we consider only the instances given219
by numerals that provably satisfy the antecedent.220
Finally, note that if quantification is restricted by a conditional expres-221
sion in which the truth predicate occurs both in the antecedent and the con-222
sequent—e.g. ∀x(Tx→ Tx), our theory has no means to know which sen-223
tences fall in the scope of T ; since the idea is to axiomatise truth in terms224
of reference, not vice versa. Sentences of this kind could exhibit danger-225
ous reference patterns without us knowing. Therefore, we just treat them as226
non-conditional expressions.227
Now we turn to the formal definition of alethic q-reference.228
Definition 2 Let ϕ,ψ be sentences of LT . ϕ q-refers to ψ in PA iff T229
occurs in ϕ and one of the conditions 1-3 holds:230
1. ϕ := ∀~vχ and231
(a) χ := Tt or χ := ¬δ and, for some ~k ∈ ω, χ[~̄k/~v] q-refers to ψ232
or has a new occurrence of Ts as a subsentence s.t. PA ` s =233
pψq; or234
(b) χ := δ → γ and235
i. both δ and γ contain T and for some ~k ∈ ω, χ[~̄k/~v] q-refers236
to ψ or contains a new occurrence of Tt as a subsentence237
s.t. PA ` t = pψq, or238
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ii. only γ (δ) contains T and there exist ~k ∈ ω and 1 ≤ i ≤ n239
s.t. PA ` δ[~̄k/~v] (¬γ[~̄k/~v]) and (δ → γ)[~̄k/~v] q-refers to240
ψ or contains a new occurrence of Tt as a subsentence s.t.241
PA ` t = pψq.242
2. ϕ := ¬χ and χ q-refers to ψ.243
3. ϕ := χ→ δ and either χ or δ q-refer to ψ.244
By a new occurrence of Tt in χ[~̄k/~v] in the above definition we mean245
that Tt occurs in the result of replacing all occurrences of Tt in χ with246
0 = 0 (or any sentence not containing T ) and then instantiating the variables247
~v with ~̄k. This is needed to avoid cases of m-reference passing as cases of248
q-reference—e.g. in ∀xTpλq.249
According to definition 2, the liar sentence λ introduced in (1) q-refers250
to itself, as well as all sentences that are obtained by weakly diagonalising251
a predicate ϕ(v) containing Tv as a subformula. Looking at the proof of252
theorem 1, we see that the real form of these sentences is253
∀u(u = p∀v(Diag(u, v)→ ϕ(v))q→ ∀v(Diag(u, v)→ ϕ(v))) (8)
Applying the clause (b)ii. of definition 2 twice, we get that (8) is q-self-254
referential. But just like in the case of m-reference, if Tv isn’t a subformula255
of ϕ(v), our definition cannot guarantee that the weak diagonalisation of256
this predicate will be a self-referential expression.257
Note that the notion of q-reference could clash with some of our intu-258
itions. If g = p¬Bew(g)q as in (3), strongly diagonalising the predicate259
∀x(x = y ∧ ¬Bew(g)→ ¬Tx) delivers a term l∗ s.t.260
PA ` l∗ = p∀x(x = l∗ ∧ ¬Bew(g)→ ¬Tx)q (9)
Since ¬Bew(g) is true in the standard model, intuitively we would say261
∀x(x = l∗ ∧¬Bew(g)→ ¬Tx) q-refers to itself. However, we’re thinking262
about reference in PA, so this won’t be the case. For PA cannot prove its own263
Gödel sentence, on pain of triviality. This is a direct consequence of adopt-264
ing provability instead of satisfaction for defining reference. As we will see265
later, this issue can be circumvented to some extent.266
Putting the notions of m- and q-reference together isn’t enough to define
reference simpliciter. Consider the following identities:
l1 = pT l2q (10)
l2 = p¬T l1q.
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This statements can be proved in PA by slightly tweaking theorem 2. To-267
gether, they give rise to a paradox akin to the liar. Sentences T l2 and ¬T l1268
m-refer only to each other but, intuitively, also refer to themselves, though269
indirectly. Alethic reference is a transitive relation.270
Definition 3 Let ϕ,ψ be sentences of LT . ϕ directly refers to ψ in PA iff it271
m- or q-refers to ψ in PA.272
Definition 4 A sequence of sentences χ0, . . . , χn ∈ LT , n ∈ ω, is a chain273
of reference in PA iff, for each i < n, χi directly refers to χi+1 in PA.274
Definition 5 Let ϕ,ψ be sentences of LT . ϕ refers to ψ in PA iff there’s a275
chain of reference in PA starting with ϕ and ending with ψ.276
According to this definition, both T l2 and ¬T l1 refer to themselves, as277
we wanted.278
It’s worth noticing that the notion of reference we present is not exten-279
sional but hyperintensional: there are logically equivalent sentences that280
don’t refer to the same things. For instance, 0 = 0 and Tpλq ∨ ¬Tpλq are281
logically equivalent but, while the former doesn’t refer to anything, the lat-282
ter refers to λ. Unlike grounding or dependence, reference is based at least283
partly on syntactic features of sentences and, therefore, extensionality fails.284
The notion of reference we introduced can be used to define relevant285
reference patterns, such as the following two.286
Definition 6 A sentence ϕ ∈ LT is self-referential in PA iff it refers to287
itself in PA.288
According to this definition, sentences such as λ in (1), ¬T l in (4) and289
T l2 and ¬T l1 in (10) turn out to be self-referential.290
Definition 7 A sentence ϕ ∈ LT is well-founded in PA iff there is no in-291
definitely extensible chain of reference in PA starting with ϕ.292
Every self-referential expression is obviously non-well-founded. But293
there are also non-well-founded sentences that don’t refer to themselves.294
Yablo’s paradox (Yablo, 1985, 1993) consist of an infinite sequence of sen-295
tences, each of which says of the ones coming after that they are untrue.296
In LT , Yablo’s sentences can be formalised as ∀x > n̄¬Tυ(x), where297
υ(v) = p∀x > v̇¬Tυ(x)q. This identity statement is provable in PA by298
strong diagonalisation, guaranteeing the existence of the list in our formal299
setting.300
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According to definitions 6 and 7, no sentence in the sequence is self-301
referential, though they are all non-well-founded. It can be shown that an302
ω-inconsistency follows from the set of T-biconditionals for sentence in303
Yablo’s list, so the paradox is actually an ω-paradox (cf. Ketland, 2005).304
If our definitions are correct, this shows that the orthodox view on semantic305
paradoxes is mistaken: there are non-self-referential (ω-)paradoxes. But this306
doesn’t spell doom to our approach, for semantic paradoxes could share a307
reference pattern other than self-reference; for instance, non-well-founded-308
ness. Later we will see this is actually the case.309
It’s easily seen that m-reference is recursive. Since the only proper310
non-recursive notion involved in the definition of q-reference is the semi-311
recursive notion of provability, and it occurs only positively, q-reference is312
also semi-recursive. By a similar reasoning, direct reference, reference and313
self-reference are semi-recursive as well. Well-foundedness, on the other314
hand, is more complex. Nonetheless, all of these notions can be defined in315
L and most of them at least weakly represented in PA. This sets reference316
further apart from the usual notions of grounding and dependence, and is317
enough to allow our notion to play a role in a disquotational axiomatisation318
of truth.319
Being q-reference strictly semi-recursive, PA can prove all positive cases,320
but some negative ones won’t be provable. For instance, PA has no means to321
know that322
∀x(x = p0 = 0q→ Tx) (11)
does not q-refer to itself. That would mean PA knows that ¬Bew(p∀x(x =323
p0 = 0q → Tx)q = p0 = 0q), this is, its own consistency. Since we want324
to be able to determine which sentences exhibit safe referential patterns to325
take them as instances of the T-schema, and (11) clearly does, we must326
add axioms to inform our theory of some negative cases of q-reference—by327
Gödel’s theorem, it’s impossible to have them all. The simplest principle we328
can add is329
∀x(Bew(¬. x)→ ¬Bew(x)) (QR)
Since QR is true-in-N, PA + QR, or QR(PA) for short, is ω-consistent. Given330
that PA knows that p∀x(x = p0 = 0q→ Tx)q 6= p0 = 0q and, therefore, that331
Bew(p∀x(x = p0 = 0q → Tx)q 6= p0 = 0q), we can conclude in QR(PA)332
that ¬Bew(p∀x(x = p0 = 0q → Tx)q = p0 = 0q), which means that (11)333




In the previous section we provided formal proof-theoretic notions of alethic336
reference, self-reference, and well-foundedness for sentences of LT in PA.337
The next step is to use them in the formulation of axiomatic disquotational338
theories of truth.339
In the spirit of Horwich’s (2005, p. 81) idea cited in the introduction, the340
most natural choice is to relativise the T-schema to the predicateWf(v) ∈ L341
that defines well-foundedness in PA according to definition 7. However, this342
wouldn’t result in a consistent system. Coming back to our example in (9),343
recall that ∀x(x = l∗ ∧ ¬Bew(g)→ ¬Tx) (= l∗) doesn’t refer to anything344
in PA, for PA 0 Bew(p¬Bew(g)q). Moreover, QR(PA) can prove this, by345
internalising a proof of Gödel’s theorem. Thus, QR(PA) ` Wf(l∗). But, as346
it turns out, the T-biconditional for ∀x(x = l∗ ∧ ¬Bew(g) → ¬Tx) leads347
directly to paradox. The reason is that this sentence is well-founded in PA348
but not in QR(PA), where it’s actually self-referential.349
To avoid this problem we restrict our attention to those sentences whose350
referenced expressions do not increase when we adopt more powerful sys-351
tems. We call them r-stable. To formally characterise them, we need the352
following auxiliary notion:353
Definition 8 A sentence ϕ ∈ LT is dr-stable iff all its subformulae of the354
form ψ → χ where a free variable occurs in the scope of T and exactly one355
of ψ, χ contains T are s.t. the one not containing T is ∆0.6356
For instance, Tp∀x(Bew(x)→ Tx)q and (11) are dr-stable, while
∀x(Bew(x)→ Tx)
isn’t, for Bew(v) /∈ ∆0. If a dr-stable sentence ϕ doesn’t directly refer to357
another sentence ψ in PA, ϕ cannot directly refer to ψ in a stronger theory358
either, since PA already decides all instances of ∆0-formulae.359
Definition 9 A sentence ϕ ∈ LT is r-stable iff it is dr-stable and refers360
only to dr-stable sentences.361
Thus, Tp∀x(Bew(x) → Tx)q isn’t r-stable, but (11) is, because it only362
refers to 0 = 0. R-unstable expressions bear a certain analogy with blind363
6By just considering ∆0-expressions and not also their PA-equivalents we’re leaving behind
many sentences which have a stable direct reference. However, this doesn’t matter for our
purposes, since in the axioms of our truth system the restriction on the T-schema will be closed
under PAT-equivalence.
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truth ascriptions: in both cases we don’t know what we are asserting and, a364
fortiori, if it’s a paradox or not. Only for r-stable sentences we can be sure365
that their reference patterns are safe.366
Since the set of ∆0-expressions is obviously semi-recursive, so is the set367
of dr-stable sentences. Given that reference is also semi-recursive, r-stability368
has Π2-complexity. Let RSt(v) ∈ Π2 define this set. The theory we intro-369
duce next restricts the T-schema to r-stable and well-founded sentences and370
their equivalents in a uniform way.371
Definition 10 WFUTB ⊆ LT extends QR(PA) with the new instances of in-
duction for LT -formulae and the following schema, where ϕ ∈ LT contains
exactly n free variables:
∀~t∀x(RSt(x(~t)) ∧Wf(x(~t))∧
∧BewPAT(pϕ(~t.)q↔. x(~t))→ (Tpϕ(~t.)q↔ ϕ(~t◦)))
WFUTB—for Well-founded Uniform Tarski Biconditionals—allows in-372
stances of the T-schema given, uniformly, by all sentences that are equiva-373
lent in PAT to an r-stable well-founded sentence. This includes of course,374
all r-stable well-founded expressions, but also, for example, ∀x((T l →375
T l)∧x = p0 = 0q→ Tx) and¬∀x(Tx→ Tx), which are not well-founded376
in PA. On the other hand, it excludes many intuitively safe instances, such377
as the one given by ∀x(Bew(x)→ Tx). We get the following results:378
Proposition 1 WFUTB is ω-consistent.379
Proof. We just give a sketch. It can be shown that if a dr-stable sentence ϕ ∈380
LT doesn’t refer directly to another sentence ψ, then there’s a set Γ ⊆ LT381
on which ϕ depends s.t. ψ /∈ Γ, by induction on the logical complexity of382
ϕ.7 It follows as a corollary that all r-stable well-founded sentences belong383
to Leitgeb’s set Φlf of expressions that depend on non-semantic states of384
affairs (cf. Leitgeb, 2005, § 3), by transfinite induction on the ordinal level of385
the fixed-point construction that leads to Φlf . Since there’s a model 〈N,Γ〉386
of LT that verifies all instances of the T-schema given by sentences in Φlf387
(Leitgeb, 2005, theorem 17), 〈N,Γ〉  WFUTB as well.388
Proposition 2 The theory of Ramified Truth up to ε0 RT<ε0 is relatively389
interpretable in WFUTB.390
7For a definition of dependence and its basic properties, see (Leitgeb, 2005).
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Proof. We just give an idea of the proof.8 We show that for each α < ε0391
there’s a predicate θᾱ(v) ∈ LT that satisfies in WFUTB the axioms that hold392
for Tα(v) in RT<ε0 .
9 First, we obtain a binary predicate θy(x) ∈ LT by393
strongly diagonalising over the variable w a complex predicate that is ba-394
sically the disjunction of the axioms of RT<ε0 , where the predicates Tα(v)395
have been replaced by Tw(ẏ/pyq)(u̇/pxq) (and, correspondingly, α with y396
and v with u). Then we show by internal transfinite induction on α that the397
uniform T-schema holds in WFUTB for all predicates θᾱ(v), where α < ε0,398
which gives us the axioms of RT<ε0 . This is done by uniformly showing399
in WFUTB that all instances of the predicates θᾱ(v) given by sentences400
in which only predicates θβ̄(v) with β < α occur are r-stable and well-401
founded.402
As a corollary of propositions 1 and 2, WFUTB is a sound and powerful403
system. Since the Kripke-Feferman theory KF and PUTB have the same404
proof-theoretic strength as RT<ε0 , WFUTB is at least as strong as these three405
well-regarded systems.406
5 Conclusions407
In this paper we have provided sound, precise, and arithmetically simple408
notions of reference, self-reference, and well-foundedness. Moreover, these409
concepts have been proved useful in the assessment of semantic paradoxes410
and in the formulation of axiomatic theories of truth.411
We have also shown that a natural theory of disquotational truth that is412
ω-consistent, as powerful as KF and PUTB, and imposes only arithmetical413
restrictions on the T-schema is possible. Our system WFUTB is therefore (a)414
sound, (b) encompassing, and (c) employs a simple selective criterion of T-415
biconditionals. As a consequence, it’s a perfect candidate for the minimalist416
search.417
Perhaps other—more powerful—systems can be devised using the no-418
tions we introduced in section 3. It could well be that paradoxes shared419
more specific reference patterns than non-well-foundedness, which could420
be turned into broader selective criteria for instances of disquotation. We421
8The proof is similar to the demonstration of Halbach’s (2011, theorem 15.25).
9As is well known, natural numbers can codify ordinals up to ε0 (and beyond). If α < ε0,
ᾱ is the numeral of its code. PA is able to prove all instances of transfinite induction up to ε0.
For the details see (Pohlers, 2009, chapter 3).
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believe this note not only provides answers to several issues such as find-422
ing a natural minimalist theory or assessing the orthodox view on semantic423
paradoxes, but also opens a new line of research on these topics.424
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